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Abstract
.This paper constructs an economic growth model with overlapping
generations. Agents’ ability in the model can be high or low. Agents
with high ability incur low costs to obtain education. On the other
hand, agents with low abflity incur high costs to obtain an education.
With physical capital accumulation, the wage becomes high enough,
and then the low-ability agents want to be thought as ahigh-ability
agent. In order to separate from the low-ability agents, the high ability
agents must send asignal to firms by obtaining high level of education.
This incurs unnecessarily high costs to the high ability agents and
absorbs their saving. This reduces physical capital accumulation and
can bring up trade cycles.
JEL Classification Numbers: J24, 041
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1Introduction
In almost advanced countries, people eager to have high levels of education.
In order to get agood position in acompany, people tries to enter highly
ranked universities and get degrees. However, abilities are quite different
among individuals. Some people have high abilities and can easily get human
capital with little effort. On the other hand, another people needs much effort
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to get human capital and further can get only alow level of human capital
compared to individuals with high abilities. Spence’s seminal paper (1973,
1974) investigates this situation and shows that the high-ability agents have
an incentive to send signals to firms in order to discriminate them ffom the
low-ability individuals by getting ahigher level of educations than the low-
ability individuals.
Now let’s consider this issue in amacroeconomic framework. Getting
high levels of educations of course needs much cost. Ordinary people some-
times must borrow money from banks to enter universities. In particular,
in Japan, primary schoolchildren or junior high school students often attend
cram schools (called Jyuku) in order to enter famous private schools. It cost
much. This may reduce the saving which was once invested into physical cap-
ital. Consequently, this may reduce output level of the education obsessed
society..
This paper constructs an economic growth model with overlapping gen-
erations in order to examine this issue. Agents with high ability incur low
costs to obtain education. On the other hand, agents with low ability in-
cur high costs to obtain an education. With physical capital accumulation,
the wage becomes high enough, and then the low-ability agents become to
want to be thought as ahigh-ability agent. In order to separate ffom the
low-ability agents, the high ability agents must send asignal to firms by
obtaining ahigher level of education. This incurs unnecessarily high costs
to the high ability agents and absorbs their saving. This reduces physical
capital accumulation and can bring up cycles.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2builds up the
model to be considered. Section 3examines the signaling game among the
agents. Section 4defines equilibrium and dynamics of the model. Section 5
gives some concluding remarks.
2Model
The model of this paper is an overlapping generations economy of $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}-$
nous growth with physical and human capital. The consumption $b\sigma \mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}_{\dot{l}}Y$
is produced by using physical, $K$ and human capital, $H$ . The production
function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form, $Y=AK^{\alpha}H^{1-\alpha},$ $A>0$ ,
$0<\alpha<1$ . Both physical capital and human capital depreciate completely
after the production.
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Each agent lives three periods (young, adult, old). We assume population
is normalized to be one. There are be two types of agents. One is an agent
with an ability to accumulate human capital cheaply. The other is an agent
without such ability. The population ratio of the agents with the ability is $\theta$ ,
and the ratio of the agents without the ability is $1-\theta$ . These ratios remain
constant. When young, the agent with the ability (the agent without the
ability) receives an education, $e_{t}^{a}(e_{t}^{n})$ and get human capital as follows:
$h_{t+1}^{a}=e_{t}^{a}+(1-\delta)H_{t},$ $h_{t}^{a}\leq\gamma H_{t},$ $\gamma>1$ (1)
$h_{t+1}^{n}=e_{t}^{n}+(1-\delta)H_{t},$ $h_{t}^{n}\leq H_{t}$ (2)
where $H_{t}$ means aggregate human capital of the economy. Each agent can
have apart of human capital of their parents’ generation without any cost.
The agent with the ability can advance the human capital level than their
parents’ level, however, the agents without the ability at most get the same
level of human capital as their parents’ level. The agents incur costs to get
human capital, but different level. The high-ability agent can accumulate
human capital more cheaply than the low-ability agent. The high-ability
agent must pay $\beta^{a}e^{a}$ , on the other hand, the low-ability agent must pay
$\beta^{n}e^{n}$ . and $0<\beta^{a}<\beta^{n}$ . In order to finance this cost, they borrow from
adult agents at the asset $\mathrm{m}\pi \mathrm{k}\dot{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{t}$ .
When adult, they work by selling their human capital to firms and get
wage income according to their human capital level which firms believe they
have. They save this income all for the old period. There are two saving
methods, one is to invest it into physical assets, the other is to lend it to
young agents who want to get educations. By arbitrage, the rates of returns
of these savings become the same.
When old, they consume all their wealth, both principal and interest.
This is the only source of their utility. Consequently, their objective becomes
the maximization of their wage income minus their repayment.
At the first period, there are only adult agents and old agents.
3Job Market Signaling
Because there are two types of agents, we have to consider the signaling game
situation at each period. The low-ability agents may have an incentive to
mimic the high-ability agents. The timing of the game is the following:
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1. Agents choose alevel of education with knowing their ability.
2. Firms observe agents’ education level, but not knowing their
ability (therefore, their borrowing levels), and make wage offers
to the agentsagents
3. The agents accept or reject the wage offer.
The objective of the agents is given by:
$\max_{ei}w_{t+1}h_{t+1}^{i}-r_{t+1}\beta^{i}e_{t}^{i},$ $i=a,$ $n$ .
Taking account of (1) and (2), we must distinguish the following five
cases:
(I) Both of the agents do not have an education.
If $r_{t+1}\beta^{n}/w_{t+1}>r_{t+1}\beta^{a}/w_{t+1}>1$ , then both types choose not be edu-
cated (see Figure 1).
$e_{t}^{a}=e_{t}^{n}=0$ .
(II) The high-ability agents begin to have an education.
YVhen $r_{t+1}\beta^{n}/w_{t+1}>r_{t+1}\beta^{a}/w_{t+1}=1$ , then the high-ability agents are
indifferent between getting an education and not getting an education. On




(III) Only the high-ability agents have an education.
’VVhen $r_{t+1}\beta^{n}/w_{t+1}>1>r_{t+1}\beta^{a}/w_{t+1}$ , then the high-ability agents have
an incentive to be educated up to the maximum level. However, the low-




(IV) The low-ability agents begin to have an education.
When $1=r_{t+1}\beta^{n}/w_{t+1}>r_{t+1}\beta^{a}/w_{t+1}$ , then the low-ability agents are
indifferent between getting an education and not getting an education. The
high-ability agents have an incentive to have an education up to their max-
imum level. If the low ability agents invest up to the maximum level of
the high-abilty agents, then firms want to distinguish the low-ability agent
who mimic the high-ability agents. But, firms cannot separate them from
the high-ability agents because they cannot observe the actual ability of the
agents. The firms can observe only the education level. Therefore, the high-
ability agents have an incentive to invest human capital over their maximum
level in order to separate them from the low-ability agents (see Figure $4$) $.1$
Consequently, we obtain the following:
e7 $=(\gamma+\delta-1)H_{t}+\epsilon H_{t},$ $\epsilon>0$
$e_{t}^{n}\in[0, \delta H_{t}]$
We assume that the high-ability agents need to overinvest $\epsilon H_{t}$ in order to
discriminate them from the low-ability agents.
(V) Both of the agents invest up to their maximum levels.
When $1>r_{t+1}\beta^{n}/w_{t+1}>r_{t+1}\beta^{a}/w_{t+1}$ , then both of the agents have
an incentive to have an education up to their maximum levels. The same
situation as case (IV) occurs. Therefore, the high-ability agents must send
asignal to firms to separate them from the low-ability agents. Accordingly
there is an unnecessary overinvestment in human capital (see Figure 5).
$e_{t}^{a}=[ \frac{w_{t+1}}{r_{t+1}\beta^{n}}(\gamma-1)+\delta]H_{t}+\epsilon H_{t},$ $\epsilon>0$
$e_{t}^{n}=\delta H_{t}$
Summarizing the preceding arguments and noting (1) and (2), we can
obtain the following human capital accumulation expressions:
lThere can be pooling equilibria other than the separating equilibrium. However, by
resorting to the Intuitive Criteria of Cho and Kreps (1987), we can refine the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. We can show that all pooling equilibria cannot survive through the
Intuitive Criteria (see Gibbons (1992).
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Bertrand competition among the firms drives the profit of the firms down to
zero. Hence, the following conditions must hold:
$w_{t}=(1-\alpha)Ak_{t}^{\alpha}$ , (3)
$r_{t}=\alpha Ak_{t}^{\alpha-1}$ , (4)
where $w_{t}$ and $r_{t}$ stands for the wage rate and the (gross) interest rate respec-
tively, and $k_{t}\equiv K_{t}/H_{t}$ .
Asset market equilibrium condition becomes
$K_{t+1}+\theta\beta^{a}e_{t}^{a}+(1-\theta)\beta^{n}e_{t}^{n}=w_{t}H_{t}-r_{t}[\theta\beta^{a}e_{t-1}^{a}+(1-\theta)\beta^{n}e_{t-1}^{n}]$ . (5)
The left hand side means the demand for funds for physical and human
capital investment. On the contrary, the right hand side means supply for
the funds. Dividing the both side of (5) by $H_{t}$ and taking account of (3) and
(4), we get the following:
$k_{t+1} \frac{H_{t+1}}{H_{t}}+\theta\beta^{a}\frac{e_{t}^{a}}{H_{t}}+(\mathrm{I}-\theta)\beta^{n}\frac{e_{t}^{n}}{H_{t}}$ (6)
$=A(1- \alpha)k_{t}^{\alpha}\wedge-A\alpha k_{t}^{\alpha-1}[\theta\beta^{a}\frac{e_{t-1}^{a}}{H_{t-1}}+(1-\theta)\beta^{n_{\frac{e_{t-1}^{n}}{H_{t-1}}}}]\frac{H_{t-1}}{H_{t}}$
We first examine the demand for the funds. Let’s denoting the demand













where $D_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{V}}= \theta(\gamma+\delta-1)(\beta^{a}+\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha})+\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}(1-\theta)$ and $\overline{D}_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{V}}=D_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{V}}+\theta(1-$
$\delta)_{\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}-\alpha}{}}+(1-\theta)\beta^{n}\delta+\theta\beta^{a}\epsilon$ . $D_{t+1}$ is acorrespondence which assigns anonempty
compact subset to every $k_{t+1}$ . We denote this correspondence as $D(k_{t+1})$ .
Next, let’s examine the supply side. By denoting the supply for the funds








$\frac{\alpha\Psi \mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}}{1-\alpha},(\mathrm{l}\mathrm{V})\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}k_{t}=\frac{\alpha\Psi \mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}}{1-\alpha}(\mathrm{V}^{\cdot})\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}(1)}{1-\alpha}<k_{t}.S_{11}=\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}11\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}.k_{t}<\frac{\alpha\beta^{a}}{1-\alpha},(\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I})A(1-[\frac{\alpha\beta^{a}(\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}}{\mathrm{I}-\alpha}]^{\alpha_{11}},=k_{t}=\frac{\alpha\beta^{\Phi}}{1-\alpha,\alpha)},\mathrm{I})\frac{\alpha\beta^{a}}{1-\alpha S},<$
$A(1- \alpha)[\frac{\alpha\beta^{a}}{1-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{1}{\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+1-\theta},$ $S_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{V}}=A(1- \alpha)[\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{(\beta^{f*}-\beta^{a})\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+\beta^{n}(1-\theta)}{\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+1-\theta}$,
and $S_{1\mathrm{V}}=A(1- \alpha)[\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{\mathrm{i}-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{\underline{(\beta^{n}}-\beta^{a})\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+\beta^{f*}(1-\delta)-\theta\beta^{a}\epsilon}{\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+1-\theta-}$ . As for the first period,
we get $S_{1}=w_{1}H_{1}=A(1-\alpha)k_{1}^{\alpha}$ . Similar to the demand correspondence, we
can define the supply correspondence as $S(k_{\mathrm{t}})$ .
Consequently, we get the following dynamics from the asset market equi-
librium condition:
$k_{\mathrm{t}+1}\in\Phi(k_{t})\equiv\{k_{\mathrm{t}+1}^{\wedge}|D(k_{t+1})\cap S(k_{t})\neq\emptyset f\sigma rk_{t}\}$ (7)
This define the dynamic path of $k_{t}^{\wedge}.\mathrm{S}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{y}$ State:
Definition 1Steady State
Steady states of the (7) is defined by $k^{-*}\in\Phi(k^{*})$ .
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There can be many patterns of the dynamics. So, let’s pick up an in-
teresting case. Figure 6depicts the demand and supply correspondences..
There is asteady state between point Aand point B. As can be seen from
this figure, this steady state happens to be case (IV). If $k_{t}$ enters into this
region, then $k_{t+1}$ must be in this region because of ($7J\cdot\ln$ this case, we have
to examine the following dynamics of $\frac{e_{t}^{n}}{H_{t}}$ . Denoting $\frac{e_{t}}{H_{t}}$ by $x_{t}^{n}$ , taking account
of $e_{t}^{a}=\gamma+\delta-1,$ $k^{*}= \frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}$ , we can express (6) as follows:
$\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}[\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+(1-\theta)x_{t}]+\theta\beta^{a}(\gamma+\delta-1+\epsilon)+(1-\theta)\beta\chi\emptyset$
$=$ $(1- \alpha)A[\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{(\beta^{n}-\beta^{a})\theta(\gamma+\delta-1+\epsilon)+\beta^{n}(1-\theta)}{\beta^{n}[\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+(1-\theta)x_{t-1}^{n}]}$
This defines the dynamics of case (IV). Consequently, the steady state of this
dynamics is defined by:
$\frac{\alpha\sqrt{}^{n}}{1-\alpha}\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+\theta\beta^{a}(\gamma+\delta-1+\epsilon)+\frac{(1-\theta)\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}x^{n*}(9)$
$=$ $(1- \alpha)A[\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{(\beta^{n}-\beta^{a})\theta(\gamma+\delta-1)+\mathcal{B}^{n}(1-\theta)}{\beta^{n}[\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+(1-\theta)x^{n*}]}$
We first examine the stability of the steady state of the dynamics of $x_{t}^{n}$ .
By differentiating the right hand side of (8) with respect to $x_{t-1}^{n}$ and dividing
this by $\frac{(1-\theta)\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}$ , we get
$-(1- \alpha)^{2}A[\frac{\alpha\beta^{n}}{1-\alpha}]^{\alpha}\frac{(\beta^{n}-\beta^{a})\theta(\gamma+\delta-1+\epsilon)+\beta^{n}(1-\theta)}{(\beta^{n})^{2}[\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+(1-\theta)x^{n*}]^{2}}$
This is the slope of the graph of the dynamics of $x_{t}^{n}$ . Therefore, when this is
smaller $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}-1$ , then the steady state is unstable (see Figure 7). By making
use of (9), we can rearrange this as follows:
$-[1+(1- \alpha)\frac{\beta^{a}\theta(\gamma+\delta-1+\epsilon)-\beta^{n}\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)]}{\beta^{n}[\{\theta\gamma+(1-\theta)(1-\delta)\}+(1-\theta)x^{n*}]}]$
Hence, the numerator takes apositive value, then the steady state becomes




This inequality can be consistent with Figure 6because this inequality does
not contain the productivity parameter $A$ .
When this condition holds, even if $k_{t}$ enters into case (IV), $k_{t}$ leave case
(IV). Then, $k_{t}$ enters case (III) or case (IV).
5Concluding Remarks
We have shown that overinvestment to human capital may absorb funds for
investment for physical capital. As mentioned in the introduction, the saving
is absorbed by expense to getting educations. This reduces income in the
adult period and thus saving volume of the adult individuals. Consequently,
this leads to adecrease in physical capital and can produce permanent cycles.
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